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1 Introduction 
It is well known that the core and competitive allocations become equivalent in per-
fectly competitive economies (that is, when no individual can affect the overall out-
come) with complete information-see, e.g., Aumann (1964) and Bewley (1973). The 
main purpose of this work is to study the equivalence of core and competitive alloca-
tions in exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. 
Radner (1968 and 1982) introduced a model of an exchange economy with differen-
tial information in which every trader is characterized by a state dependent utility 
function, a random vector of initial endowments, an information partition (i.e., a 
partition of the space of states of nature), and a prior belief. In these works Radner 
extended the notion of Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium to exchange economies 
with differential information. The notion of competitive equilibrium which we use in 
the present paper is a straightforward extension of that of Radner (1982) to economies 
with a continuum of traders. The existence of competitive equilibrium in economies 
with a continuum of traders and complete information was studied in Aumann (1966) 
and Hildenbrand (1970). In this paper, by using general results from Hildenbrand 
(1974) we derive the existence of competitive equilibrium for economies with a con-
tinuum of traders and differential information. 
In a seminal paper, Wilson (1978) examines the core of an exchange economy 
with differential information. Wilson focuses on two special cases: the coarse core, 
defined by the condition that the information for all traders in a blocking coalition 
is that they have in common, and the fine core, defined by giving every member of a 
blocking coalition the joint information of the members of the coalition. Wilson then 
showed that the coarse core is non-empty, and that the fine core may be empty. Since 
Wilson's article, several works on cooperative solution concepts for an economy with 
differential information appeared in the literature; see, for example, Kobayashi (1980), 
Yannelis (1991), Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), Krasa and Yannelis (1994), and 
AlIen (1991, 1995, 1997). Yannelis (1991) introduced the notion of private core, 
defined by the condition that in a blocking coalition the net trade of each member of 
the coalition is measurable with respect to his information partition. Yannelis (1991) 
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showed that under appropriate assumptions the private core of an economy is non-
empty. AlIen (1991) and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993) introduced the notion 
of weak fine core, a version of Wilson's fine core, and showed that this core is non-
empty. In the definition of weak fine core all net trades are measurable with respect 
to the "joint partition" of all the traders (i.e., the smallest partition which refines 
the information of all the traders), and as in the fine core, blocking net trades are 
measurable with respect to the "joint partition" of all the members of the coalition. 
In this paper we study the equivalence of the core and competitive allocations in 
exchange economies with a continuum of traders and differential information. We 
consider two period Radner-type economies with a finite number of states of nature 
and a continuum of traders. In these economies consumption takes place in the second 
period. In the first period there is uncertainty about the state of nature; in this period 
traders arrange contracts that may be contingent on the realized state of nature in 
the second period. 
We first examine the existence of competitive equilibria in these economies. We 
show that if an economy is irreducible, then an equilibrium exists under mild con-
ditions (continuity and weak monotonicity of traders utilities). The irreducibility 
condition was introduced by Mckenzie (1959) for exchange economies with a finite 
number of traders, and it has been extended to economies with a continuum of traders 
by Hildenbrand (1974). It expresses the idea that the endowment of every coalition, 
if added to the allocation of the complementary coalition, can be used to improve the 
welfare of every member of the complementary coalition. We show that this condition 
is satisfied if, for example, for every state of nature the initial endowment of every 
trader is in the interior of the commodity space. We also show that if the economy 
is irreducible, then the set of private core allocations of the economy coincides with 
the set of Radner competitive equilibrium allocations. We provide simple examples 
which show that without irreducibility these results may not hold. 
For the weak fine core, we show (without assuming irreducibility) that if the 
traders utility functions are continuous and strictly increasing, and if for every trader 
there is a state of nature such that his initial endowment in this state of nature is 
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non-zero, then the weak fine core coincides with the set of competitive allocations 
of an associated economy with symmetric information which is identical to the orig-
inal economy, except for the traders information, which is taken to be the "joint 
information" of all the traders in the original economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 
3 we discuss the existence of competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner). In 
Section 4 we prove the equivalence between competitive and private core allocations. 
Finally, in Section 5 we establish the equivalence of the weak fine core and the set of 
competitive allocations of the associated symmetric information economy. 
2 The Model 
We consider a Radner-type exchange economy £ with differential information (e.g., 
Radner (1968 and 1982)}. Our commodity space is lR~. The space of traders is a 
measure space (T,~, J.L), where T is a set (the set of traders), ~ is a a-field of subsets 
of T (the set of coalitions), and J.L is a non-atomic measure on ~. The economy extends 
over two time periods, T = 0,1. Consumption takes place at T = 1. At T = 0 there 
is uncertainty over the state of nature; in this period traders arrange contracts that 
may be contingent on the realized state of nature at T = 1. There is a finite space of 
states of nature, denoted by n. At T = 1 traders do not necessarily know which state 
of nature wEn actually occurred, although they know their own endowments, and 
may also have some additional information about the state of nature. We assume 
that the information of a trader t E T is described by a partition IIt of n. We denote 
by Ft the field generated by II t • If Wo is the true state of the economy at T = 1, trader 
t observes the member of IIt which contains Wo. Every trader t E T has a probability 
measure qt on n which represents his prior beliefs. The preferences of a trader t E T 
are represented by a random utility function, Ut : n x lR~ -+ lR+ such that for every 
(t, x) E n x lR~, the mapping (t, x) -+ Ut(w, x) is E x B measurable, where w is a 
fixed member of n, and B is the a-field of Borel subsets of lR~. We assume also that 
for every x E lR~ the function Ut(', x) is Fcmeasurable. If x is a function from n to 
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~~ we denote by ht(x) the expected utility with respect to x of trader t E T. That is 
ht(x) = :L qt(w)Ut(w, x(w)). 
wEn 
An assignment is a function x : T x n ---+ ~~ such that for every wEn the 
function x(·,w) is J.L-integrable on T. There is a fixed initial assignment e; e(t,w) 
represents the initial endowment density of trader t E T in the state of nature wEn. 
We assume that for almost every t E T the function e(t,·) is Ft-measurable. 
Throughout the paper we use the following notations. For two vectors x 
(Xl, ... ,Xl) and y = (YI, ... ,Yl) in ~ we write X 2: y when Xk 2: Yk for alII::; k::; l, 
X > y when X 2: y and X =1= y, and X » y when Xk > Yk for all 1 ::; k ::; 1. 
3 Competitive Equilibrium 
In this section we extend Radner's (1982) definition of competitive equilibrium to 
our model (see Radner (1982), Section 3.4), and discuss conditions under which its 
existence can be guaranteed. Throughout the rest of the paper, an economy £ is an 
atomless economy with differential information as described in Section 2. 
A private allocation for an economy £ is an assignment x such that 
(3.1) For almost all t E T the function x(t,·) is Ft-measurable, and 
(3.2) ITX(t,w)dJ.L::; ITe(t,w)dJ.L for all wEn. 
A price system is a non-zero function p : n ---+ ~~. Let t E T and let Mt be the set 
of all Ft-measurable functions from n to ~~. For a price system p, define the budget 
set of t by 
Bt(p) = {X I X E Mt and :Lp(w) . x(w) ::; LP(w) . e(t,w)} . 
wEn wEn 
A competitive equilibrium (in the sense of Radner) for an economy £ is a pair 
(p, x) where p is a price system and x is private allocation such that 
(3.3) For almost all t E T the function x(t,·) maximizes ht on Bt(p), and 
(3.4) LWEnP(w) . ITX(t, w)dJ.L = LWEnP(w) . IT e(t, w)dJ.L. 
A competitive allocation is a private allocation x for which there exists a price system 
P such that (p, x) is a competitive equilibrium. 
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Usually in the literature, the inequality (3.2) in the definition of a private allo-
cation is replaced with a strict equality; see, e.g., Radner 1968, Krasa and Yannelis 
(1994), AlIen (1997). Here we follow Radner (1982) who noted that the total amount 
to be disposed of might not be measurable with respect to the information partition 
of a single agent. Einy and Shitovitz (1998) provided an example of an economy with 
differential information which has a competitive equilibrium, but if the inequality 
(3.2) in the definition of a private allocation is replaced with an equality, then the 
economy does not have a competitive equilibrium where all prices are non-negative-
see Example 2.1 in Einy and Shitovitz (1998). 
A function u : ~+ - ~ is (strictly) increasing if for all x, y E R~, (x > y) x » y 
implies u(x) > u(y). 
Throughout the paper we will often refer to the following conditions. 
(A.l) For every wEn we have IT e(t, w)dJ1. » o. 
(A.2) For almost all t E T and for every wEn, the function Ut(w,') is continuous 
and increasing on R~. 
(A.3) Irreducibility: for every private allocation x and for every two disjoint coali-
tions T1 , T2 E L: such that J1.(T1) > 0 and J1.(T2) > 0, and Tl U T2 = T, there exists an 
assignment y such that y(t,·) E Mt for almost all t E T2, and such that 
(A.3.1) ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E T2, and 
(A.3.2) for all wEn: ITl e(t, w)dJ1. + IT2 x(t, w)dJ1. ~ IT2 y(t, w)dJ1.. 
Irreducibility, Condition (A.3), was introduced in McKenzie (1959) for economies 
with a finite number of traders. This condition was extended for atomless economies 
by Hildenbrand (see Hildenbrand (1974), pages 143 and 214), and it expresses the 
idea that the endowment of every coalition is desired. Our definition is a variant of 
Hildenbrand's (1974). 
Proposition 3.1. Assume that an economy £ satisfies assumption (A.2). If for 
almost every t E T and all wEn we have e( t, w) » 0, then £ satisfies Irreducibility 
(A.3). 
Proof: Assume that e(t,w) » 0 for almost every t E T and all wEn. Let x be 
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a private allocation in £, and let T1, T2 E ~ be two disjoint coalitions such that such 
that f..L(Td > 0 and f..L(T2) > 0, and Tl U T2 = T. Then for all wEn we have 
{ e(t, w)df..L » o. iT! 
Let a E ~~ be such that f..L(T2)a» 0, and such that for all wEn we have 
Define y : T x n ~ ~~ by 
y(t,w) = { 
0 
x(t,w)+a 
Then for all t E T2 , y(t,·) E Mt. Since for almost all t E T and all wEn, Ut(w,·) is 
increasing, we have 
ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)), 
for almost all t E T2 . From the choice of a it is clear that (A.3.2) holds for x and y. 
o 
A quasi equilibrium for the economy £ is a pair (p, x), where p is a price system 
and x is a private allocation, such that 
(3.5) For almost all t E T, either L:wEnP(w). e(t,w) = 0, or the function x(t,·) 
maximizes ht on Et (p), and 
Proposition 3.2. If an economy £ satisfies conditions (A.l)- (A.3), then every 
quasi equilibrium of £ is a competitive equilibrium. 
Proof: Proposition 3.2 is a direct consequence of Proposition 1 in Hildenbrand 
(1974), page 214, when the consumption sets are Mt and the utilities functions ht, 
t E T, and the production sets are (~~)n. 0 
Theorem A. If an economy £ satisfies assumptions (A.l) - (A.3) then it has a 
competitive equilibrium. 
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Proof: First note that our definition of quasi equilibrium is a special case of 
Hildenbrand (1970 and 1974) definition of quasi equilibrium for a coalition production 
economy where the consumption sets are Mt and the utilities functions ht, t E T, 
and the production sets are (~~f! (see Hildenbrand (1970), Section 2, page 611). 
Therefore by Theorem 2 in Hildenbrand (1970), our economy has a quasi equilibrium 
(p,x). By Proposition 3.2, (p,x) is a competitive equilibrium of £. 0 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 
A. 
Corollary 3.3. If an economy £ satisfies (A.l), (A.2) and in addition for every 
wE 0 and almost all t E T we have e{t,w) » 0, then £ has a competitive equilibrium. 
4 The Private Core 
In this section we extend the definition of private core introduced in Yannelis (1991) 
to our economy, and show that under conditions (A.l) - (A.3) the set of competitive 
allocations of the economy coincides with the set of private core allocations. 
An assignment x is a private core allocation for the economy £ if 
(4.1) x is a private allocation, and 
(4.2) there do not exist a coalition S E 1; and an assignment y such that 
(4.2.1) J-l{S) > 0, 
(4.2.2) y(t,') is Ft-measurable for all t E S, 
(4.2.3) fsy(t,w)dJ-l ~ fse(t,w) for all wE 0, and 
(4.2.4) ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E S. 
The private core of an economy £ is the set of all private core allocations of £. 
Proposition 4.1. Every competitive allocation of an economy £ is a private core 
allocation of £. 
Proof: Proposition 4.1 is a special case of Proposition 2, page 216 in Hildenbrand 
(1974). 0 
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Theorem B. Under assumptions (A.l) - (A.3) the set of competitive allocations of 
an economy £ coincides with the private core of £. 
Proof: By Proposition (4.1) it suffices to show that every private core allocation 
in £ is a competitive allocation. Let x be a private core allocation in £. By Theorem 
1, page 216 of Hildenbrand (1974), there is a price system p such that (p, x) is a 
quasi equilibrium for £. By Proposition 3.2 we obtain that (p, x) is a competitive 
equilibrium for £.D 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 3.1 and Theorem 
B. 
Corollary 4.2. If an economy £ satisfies (A.l), (A.2), and in addition for every 
wEn and almost all t E T we have e (t, w) » 0, then the set of competitive allocations 
of c coincides with the private core of c. 
We now give an example of an atomless economy with complete information which 
satisfies (A.l) and (A.2) but does not satisfies Irreducibility (Condition (A.3)), and 
which does not have a competitive equilibrium, although it has a non-empty core. 
Example 4.3. Consider an atomless economy c in which the space of traders is 
([0,2]' E, ,\), where E is the a-field of Borel subsets of [0,2] and ,\ is the Lebesgue 
measure. Traders have complete information, and the commodity space is ~~. Every 
trader in the interval Tl = [0,1] has an initial endowment el = (1,0) and utility 
function Ul(X,y) = x, whereas each trader in the interval T2 = (1,2] has initial 
endowment e2 = (1,1) and utility function U2(X, y) = y. The core of the economy c 
consists of all allocations x such that 
{ 
a(t) 
Ut(x(t)) = 1 
where a : Tl ~ ~+ is an integrable function such that a(t) 2: 1 for almost all 
t E Tl and ITl a(t)d,\ ::; 2. It is easy to see that every core allocation in £ is a quasi 
equilibrium allocation with price systemp = (0,1). However, the economy £ does not 
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have a competitive equilibrium. It is worth noticing that the core of this economy 
contains allocations that do not have the Equal 'freatment Property. 
In the following example we consider an economy with asymmetric information in 
which the utility functions of the traders are strictly increasing and strictly concave. 
The economy does not satisfy Irreducibility (A.3), and it does not have a compet-
itive equilibrium, although its private core is non-empty (it consists of the initial 
assignment) . 
Example 4.4. Consider an atomless economy c in which the space of traders is 
([0,2]' E, A), where E is the a-field of Borel subsets of [0,2] and A is the Lebesgue 
measure. The commodity space is ~~, and the space of states of nature is n = 
{Wl' W2}. The information partition of every trader t in the interval Tl = [0,1] is 
IT 1 = {{ Wl} , { W2}} , his prior belief is ql = (~, ~), his initial endowment is el where 
el(t,wl) = el(wl) = (1,0) and el(t,w2) = el(w2) = (0,1) for all t E Tl , and his utility 
function Ul(W, (x, y)) = Vx + y'y, for all wEn. The information partition of every 
trader t in the interval T2 = [0, 1] is IT2 = {{ Wl, W2}} , his prior belief is q2 = (~, ~), 
his initial endowment is e2, where e2(t,wl) = e2(t,w2) = (1,1) for all t E T2, and 
his utility function is U2(W, (x, y)) = ..jX + y'y, for all wEn. It is easy to see that 
the economy does not have a competitive equilibrium. However, the unique private 
core allocation is the initial assignment e. Note that (p, e), where p{wd = (0,1) and 
P{W2) = (1,0), is a quasi equilibrium for c. 
5 The Weak Fine Core 
In this section we extend to our model the definition of "weak fine core" introduced 
by AlIen (1991) and Koutsougeras and Yannelis (1993), and we prove an equivalence 
theorem for this notion of core. 
\Ve first note that since n is a finite set, there is a finite number of different 
information partitions. Let us be given an economy c, and denote by IT l , ... ,ITn the 
n distinct information partitions of the traders. For every 1 ~ i ~ n, let Fi be the 
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field generated by ITi , and let 
We assume that for every 1 ~ i ~ n the set Ti is measurable and J-t(Ti) > o. If 
1 C {I, ... , n} is a non-empty set, we denote by ViE I Fi the smallest field which 
contains each n, i E I. If 8 E E is a coalition with J-t(8) > 0, we denote 
1(8) = {i Ell J-t(8nTi) > O}. 
An assignment x for the economy £, is called a weak fine core allocation if 
(5.1) For almost all t E T the function x(t,.) is V~=l Fi-measurable; 
(5.2) For every wEn, IT x(t, w)dJ-t ~ IT e(t, w)dJ-t; 
(5.3) there do not exist a coalition 8 E E and an assignment y such that 
(5.3.1) J-t(8) > 0, 
(5.3.2) y(t,.) is ViEI(S) Fi-measurable for all t E 8, 
(5.3.3) Isy(t,w)dJ-t ~ Ise(t,w)dJ-t for all wEn, and 
(5.3.4) ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)) for almost all t E 8. 
The weak fine core of £, is defined as the set of all weak fine core allocations of £'. 
We now introduce the following condition. 
(A.4) If A E V~=l n is non-empty, then qt(A) > 0 for almost all t E T. 
We denote by £,* an economy identical to £, except for the information fields of the 
traders, which for all t E T is taken to be Ft = V~=l n. Note that the information 
in £,* is symmetric. 
In the proof of the following proposition we use a result of Vind (1972) which 
asserts that in Aumann (1964) atomless economy if an allocation is blocked, then 
the blocking coalition can be chosen with a measure which is arbitrarily close to the 
measure of the grand coalition. 
Proposition 5.1. Assume that an economy £, satisfies (A.l), (A.2) and (A.4), and 
in addition for almost all t E T and for every wEn the function Ut (w, .) is strictly 
increasing. Then the weak fine core of £, coincides with the private core of £,*. 
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Proof: It is clear that every private core allocation in £* is a weak fine allocation 
of £. We prove the converse. Let IT = V~=l ITi (i.e., IT is the smallest partition of n 
that refines each ITi). Denote IT = {AI, ... , Ad, and let X be the set of all members 
of (~+)n which are V~=I.1i-measurable. Then every member of X is constant on 
every Aj, 1 ~ j ~ k. Let the function a : X --+ lR~ be defined by a{x) = X, 
where for 1 ~ j ~ k, Xj = x(Wj) for some Wj E Aj . Note that a is a one to one 
mapping from X onto lR~. For every t E T we define a function ht : lR~ --+ lR by 
ht(i;) = ht{a-l(x)). Then ht is continuous, and by (A.4) it is strictly increasing. 
Consider now the complete information atomless economy '£ in which the space of 
traders is (T, L:, j1), the commodity space is ~~, the initial assignment is e, where 
e(t) = a(e(t, .)) for all t E T, and the utility function of trader t is ht . Let y be a 
weak fine core allocation of £. Assume, contrary to our claim, that y is not a private 
core allocation of £*. For every t E T let y(t) = a(y(t,·)). Then y is not in the core 
of the economy £. Therefore by the Theorem of Vind (1972), there exists a coalition 
S E L: and an assignment z in '£ such that j1(S) > j1(T) - min{j1(Tl) , ... , j1(Tn)} , 
fsz(t)dj1 ~ f s e(t)dj1, and ht(z(t)) > ht(y(t)) for almost all t E S. For every t ET 
let z(t,.) = a-l(z(t)). Then for everyw E n we have 
is z(t,w)dj1 ~ is e(t,w)dj1. 
Since j1(S) > j1(T) - min{j1(TI) , ... , j1(Tn)} , we have 1(S) = {I, 2, ... ,n} and thus z 
is ViE/CS) ,ri-measurable. 
For almost all t E S we have 
which contradicts the assumption that y is a weak fine core allocation of £. 0 
Lemma 5.2. Assume that an economy £ satisfies the assumptions of Proposition 
5.1, and in addition for almost every t E T there is wEn such that e(t,w) =1= o. 
Then the economy £*is irreducible, i.e., it satisfies condition (A.3). 
Proof: Let x be a private allocation in £*, and let TI , T2 be two disjoint coalitions 
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in L; such that T = Tl U T2 , and j1(T1 ) > 0, j1(T2 ) > o. For every (t, w) ET x n let 
y(t,w) = 
{ 
0 
x(t, w) + Jl(h) fTl e(t, w)dj1 
Then for every t E T, y(t,·) is V~l.1i-measurable. Since Ut(w,·) is strictly increasing 
for almost all t E T and all wEn, and Jl(~2) fTl e(t,w)dj1 > 0 for some wEn, it 
follows from (AA) that for almost every t E T2 
ht(y(t, .)) > ht(x(t, .)). 
Moreover, for all wEn we have 
Therefore £* is irreducible. 0 
Theorem C. Assume that an economy £ satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 5.2. 
Then the weak fine core of £ coincides with the set of competitive allocations of £*. 
Proof: The proof follows directly from Proposition 5.1, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 
B.O 
We conclude with the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.3. If an economy £ satisfies the assumptions (A.l), (A.2), and in 
addition for every wEn and almost all t E T, e(t,w) » 0, then the weak fine core 
of £ coincides with the set of competitive allocations of £*. 
Proof: The proof is the same as that of Theorem C, noticing that £* is irreducible 
and the theorem in Vind (1972) holds under the assumptions of Proposition 5.3. 0 
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